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26 loan (SAL). The proposal followed a year of discussion with the operations chief Ernest 27 Stern, with the outline of the SAL emerging on a flight the two took together to the Bank-28 Fund Annual Meeting in Belgrade in late September 1979. The loans would provide 29 finance over a period of several years in return for reforms in trade protection and price 30 incentives for efficient resource use. 1 The introduction of the new instrument came against 31 the backdrop of the second oil shock in 1979. It was intended as a preventative instrument 32 so that the bcurrent account deficits of many developing countries do not become so large 33 as to jeopardize seriously the implementation of current investment programs.Q Although 34 the IMF had always been making badjustment loansQ in the form of standbys, the IMF also 35 in the 1980s expanded the number and maturity of adjustment loans it was making. 36 The dual rationale from the SALs from the beginning was to maintain growth and to 37 facilitate balance of payments adjustment. The bspecific objectiveQ of the SALs were to 38 help countries breduce their current account deficit to more manageable proportions by 39 supporting programs of adjustment . . . to strengthen their balance of payments, while 40 maintaining their growth and developmental momentum.Q 2 As the 1981 World Develop-41 ment Report said, successful adjustment implies ba minimum sacrifice of income 42 growth.Q 3 This emphasis on growth continued. In June 1983, for example, the World Bank 43 and IMF published excerpts of speeches by their respective heads under the overall 44 heading: bAdjustment and growth: how the Fund and the Bank are responding to current 45 difficulties.b 4 In 1986, the World Bank president A.W. Clausen gave a speech entitled 46 bAdjustment with growth in the developing world: a challenge for the international 47 communityQ. 5 In 1987, the World Bank and IMF published a volume entitled bGrowth-48 oriented adjustment programsQ with an introduction discussing the bfundamental 49 complementarityQ of badjustment and economic growth.Q 6 50 Because the SALs were supposed to facilitate balance of payments correction, the 51 structural adjustment loans were intended to end after a period of several years of 52 adjustment. As the initial McNamara document put it, structural adjustment lending 53 entailed ban association with a borrower in a program of structural change over 3 to 5 54 years which will require financial support.Q 7 55 A flavor of the early structural adjustment package is given in 1981 in the first of what 56 would turn out to be 26 structural adjustment loans to Cote d'Ivoire:
57
The loan would be in support of the Government's program of structural adjustment. 58 The reforms envisaged by the program are designed to improve the level of public 59 savings and the efficiency in the use of public resources; restructure the agricultural 60 planning system and associated development institutions so that an expanded, well-61 designed investment program yielding high returns can be mounted in the sector;
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62 reflect the costs of providing public services to the sector; assure that rational prices 63 and world market conditions would guide decisions to invest and produce; 64 restructure public enterprise, management, financing and accountability to ensure 65 efficient market oriented operations; and restructure incentives, to promote efficient 66 export-oriented industrial investments. 8 
67
This statement already contains the main features of what would characterize 68 adjustment lending for the next two decades for the IMF and World Bank: fiscal 69 adjustment, getting the prices right, trade liberalization, and, in general, a movement 70 towards free markets and away from state intervention.
71 The IMF had long been doing conditional stand-by loans, but it also expanded the 72 number and types of adjustment loans in the 1980s. IMF adjustment loans, which often 73 served as a prerequisite for World Bank adjustment loans, stressed macroeconomic 74 stabilization-especially fiscal adjustment and inflation stabilization. Exchange rate 75 devaluation was also a key element in IMF loans. IMF and World Bank conditionality 76 has evolved over time, but there is a common element of macroadjustment and getting 77 prices right that has remained constant from the beginning.
78 One way to evaluate an initiative like adjustment lending is to compare results to 79 objectives. This kind of evaluation is informative because it measures success against the 80 ex ante benchmarks imposed by the policy-making institutions themselves and against the 81 expectations they created. This kind of monitoring of policy-making institutions has some 82 normative value in that it has strong incentives for the institutions; it elicits strong effort 83 from the institutions because it does not allow them to blame poor outcomes on 84 unobservable shocks or on their particular choice of control variables. The conclusions 85 reached by this kind of evaluation are not particularly favorable: bthere is a long legacy of 86 failed adjustment lending where there was no domestic constituency for reform ... donors 87 have not been sufficiently selective with policy-based lendingQ (World Bank, 1998, p. 48) .
88 Or, as a more recent study, World Bank study of African cases puts it, bthat the 10 89 countries in our sample all received large amounts of aid, including conditional loans, yet 90 ended up with vastly different policies suggests that aid is not a primary determinant of 91 policyQ (Devarajan et al., 2001, p. 2) . This follows the World Bank's (1994) Adjustment in 92 Africa report that found limited and uneven policy improvement in countries undergoing 93 bstructural adjustment.Q The World Bank's (2002, pp. 110-111) most recent statement 94 about structural adjustment is the guarded statement that it bcan contribute, and often has 95 contributed, to growth,Q but bthe performance of adjustment operations has been mixed, 96 especially during the 1980s.Q 97 Another way to evaluate success is the counterfactual methodology-how the 98 intervention changed the outcome compared to what would have happened without the 99 intervention. Countries that received adjustment loans did so because they were having 100 poor macroeconomic and growth outcomes, and so it would not be surprising if we found 101 a negative association between these outcomes and adjustment loans without correcting 102 for selection bias. To use a medical analogy, we would expect hospital patients to be sicker 103 than the average person on the street, but this does not imply that hospitals cause sickness.
The vast literature on evaluating IMF and World Bank adjustment loans has made much 105 of the selection bias problem. 9 This has variously been addressed by using Heckman-type 106 selection techniques, before and after analysis, or control group methodology. For 107 example, in an earlier research, the World Bank (1992, p. 2) found that after controlling for 108 selection bias, adjustment lending meant bthe middle-income countries enjoyed growth 109 four percentage points higher than would otherwise have occurred and the low-income 110 group had growth two percentage points higher.Q This early study concludes badjustment 111 lending is also associated with improved policies.Q However, the results from a wide range 112 of independent researchers, World Bank and IMF studies have been all over the map, with 113 positive, zero, or negative effects of adjustment lending on growth, and with similarly 114 mixed evidence of AL on policies (see the survey by Killick et al., 1998) . Two recent 115 studies (Przeworski and Vreeland, 2000; Barro and Lee, 2002 ) find a significantly negative 116 effect of IMF lending on growth.
117 These studies have almost universally treated adjustment loans as independent events, 118 not using the information contained in the frequent repetition of adjustment loans to the 119 same country. The repetition of adjustment loans changes-even if it does not eliminate-120 the nature of the selection bias. To return to the medical analogy, if a patient is readmitted to 121 the hospital after the first treatment, this suggests that the first treatment was not effective.
122 The alternative, more favorable, explanation for why adjustment loans were repeated is 123 that adjustment was a multistage process that required multiple loans to be completed. In 124 the medical analogy, the patient needed multiple doses of medicine to fully cure the illness.
125 Under this interpretation, we would expect to see a gradual improvement in performance 126 with each successive adjustment loans, or at least an improvement after a certain threshold 127 in adjustment lending was passed.
128 Selection bias could still operate with repetition if adjustment loans were repeatedly 129 initiated in countries that failed to correct the macroeconomic problems and poor growth 130 under earlier adjustment loans. It could be that governments failed to follow through with 131 the conditions of each loan (the patients did not take their medicine) and so additional 132 programs became necessary. If this is the explanation, then the question then becomes why 133 the IMF and World Bank kept giving new adjustment lending resources to countries that 134 had such a poor track record of compliance with the conditions. Again, the interpretation is 135 not particularly favorable to the effectiveness of adjustment lending as a way to induce 136 badjustment with growth.Q 137 2. Repeated adjustment lending-the record
138
The first informative statistics is simply that adjustment loans were often made multiple 139 times to the same country. Among the top 20 of adjustment loan recipients (Table 1) , there 10 One might expect that it would take more than one loan to accomplish 145 badjustmentQ, but it's hard to see why it would take such a large number. The data do not 146 display any obvious satiation point with adjustment loans. Fig. 1 shows on the y-axis the 147 fraction of countries that received one or more subsequent adjustment loans after having 1980-99. 10 Because the IMF has been in the conditional loan business for a while, we could go back further with data on IMF loans. We get such startling results for the percent of time under an IMF program since 1965 as the Philippines (78%), Guyana (65%), and Haiti (64%). These are not exactly stellar performers. 11 The IEO report suggests that the IMF board and 154 management accepted longer use of IMF resources in the 1980s and 1990s because it was 155 felt that borrowers' problems required slow structural reforms that took many programs to 156 work out, because aid donors cut back funds, and because other external lenders (and G-7 157 governments) pressured the IMF to stay involved in the borrower to give a bgood 158 housekeeping seal of approvalQ. A similar analysis would probably explain repeated World 159 Bank structural adjustment loans. Hence, the emergence of prolonged use of IMF 160 resources and the repeated World Bank adjustment loans in the 1980s and 1990s was 161 partly as a result of external pressures. Nevertheless, it remains interesting for policy 162 analysis to assess how effective was the repeated use of IMF and World Bank adjustment 163 loans.
164 Table 1 shows the macroeconomic experience of the top 20 recipients of adjustment 165 loans, as measured by total number of adjustment loans from the IMF and World Bank 166 over 1980-99. The table shows macroeconomic outcomes averaged over the period from 167 their first adjustment loan to 1999. Looking first at the summary statistics, we see that 168 these intensive recipients of adjustment lending had about the same macroeconomic 169 outcomes as the developing country sample. Contrary to the objective of badjustment with 170 growth,Q the intensive recipients of adjustment loans had the same near-zero per capita 171 growth rate as the overall developing country sample. They also had the same current 172 account deficit, the same government deficit, and the same black market premium and 173 inflation rate, and the same near-zero real overvaluation and real interest rate. The rest of 174 the developing country sample includes a mixture of countries that had macrodistortions 175 so extreme that they were unwilling or ineligible to seek intensive adjustment lending and 176 countries that had macro balances sufficiently under control so as not to need adjustment 177 loans. Likewise, the intensive adjustment lending sample includes cases of successful and 178 unsuccessful adjustment. On average, the two samples of intensive adjustment lending and 179 the rest of the developing country samples were not significantly different over the 1980s 180 and 1990s (Table 2) . 181 Looking at the minimums and maximums for each macrovariable, we see that intensive 182 adjustment lending was associated with a high variance of macroeconomic outcomes. In 183 the worst cases, there were very poor macroeconomic outcomes: very negative growth, 184 very large current account and budget deficits, roughly triple-digit percent black market 185 premiums, inflation rate, and real overvaluation, and either very negative real interest rates 186 or extremely high positive real interest rates averaged over the entire period of intensive 187 adjustment lending. These are surprising outcomes in countries supposedly under 188 intensive conditionality for an average of 19 adjustment loans.
In the best cases, growth was strongly positive and all of these macroeconomic 190 imbalances were under control. Unfortunately, as we see from the individual cases, there 191 were no examples where growth was respectable and all of the macroeconomic imbalances 192 were under control for the adjustment lending period. Uganda had good growth, but erratic 193 and high inflation and black market premiums through 1992, despite having received 14 194 adjustment loans by that time. Pakistan had the highest growth in the intensive AL sample, 195 but consistently ran large budget deficits that left it with a major public debt crisis by the 196 end of the period. Bangladesh had respectable growth, but maintained large black market 197 premiums through 1993, despite 17 adjustment loans over that period. Ghana has also 198 been touted as a success story of adjustment lending, but we see a recurrent problem with 199 inflation despite 26 adjustment loans.
200 This intensive adjustment lending group includes some notable disasters. Zambia 201 received 18 adjustment loans but had sharply negative growth, large current account and 202 budget deficits, high inflation, a high black market premium, massive real overvaluation, 203 and a negative real interest rate. Cote d'Ivoire got 26 adjustment loans but had negative 204 growth, high current account deficits, and an overvalued real exchange rate (although there t2.1 225 These results do not prove that adjustment lending was ineffective in promoting good 226 macroeconomic policies and good growth outcomes. It may be that performance would 227 have been even worse without intensive adjustment lending. However, these results place 228 bounds on our intuition on the counterfactual outcomes. It is necessary to believe that a 229 worst case scenario like Zambia would have had even more negative growth, even higher 230 inflation, even more extreme overvaluation and black market premiums, and even more 231 financial repression without repeated adjustment lending than it did with repeated 232 adjustment lending. For a middle-income country example, if we took the World Bank 233 (1992) counterfactual finding at face value, this would imply that Mexico would have had 234 À3.6% per capita growth per annum in the absence of its 20 adjustment loans, compared 235 to its actual outcome of 0.4% per capita growth. For the whole sample of intensive 236 adjustment lending countries, it is necessary to believe that per capita growth would have 237 been negative in the absence of repeated adjustment lending. 238 This is not to deny that some kind of selection bias could still be operating with 239 repeated adjustment loans, but, as noted above, the interpretation of such selection bias is 240 itself rather unflattering for adjustment lending. The adverse selection of repeated failures 241 is a plausible description of what happened in many countries, but this raises questions 242 about why the Fund and Bank make new loans to countries that have failed to deliver 243 reform in response to old loans.
244 If a continual stream of negative exogenous shocks were driving the poor macro-245 economic and growth outcomes, then perhaps the pattern of repeated adjustment loans in 246 the face of poor outcomes is more comprehensible. I calculated also the terms of trade 247 shocks over the adjustment lending period for each of these 20 cases. On average, the 248 terms of trade change was only slightly negative, a decline of about 0.5% per year, which 249 is the same for the developing country sample as a whole. Of course, there was Table 1 had sufficiently high debt ratios to be declared eligible for HIPC debt 267 relief (including the bsuccess storiesQ of Ghana and Uganda).
268 This result may be biased towards low-growth economies because the IDA 269 eligibility for HIPC was defined at the end of the period. However, Table 3 shows 270 what happened to the countries that were classified as IDA in 1980, dividing them 271 equally into high-and low-adjustment lending recipients. Out of the eighteen 1980 IDA 272 countries that were high adjustment loan recipients, all, except Bangladesh, became 273 HIPCs by the end of the period. The low-adjustment lending countries were much less 274 likely to become HIPCs. 275 This HIPC outcome may have come about because of the IMF and World Bank practice 276 of bfilling the financing gapQ with new loans, which creates perverse incentives for 277 countries to borrow anew rather than make the macro adjustments necessary to service the 278 old debt (Easterly, 1999 (Easterly, , 2001 Ratha, 2001) . Both the IMF and World Bank may have 279 been motivated to give new adjustment loans so countries could service their old 280 adjustment loans.
281 Another special case of adjustment lending was in the ex-Communist btransitionQ 282 countries. These countries only received adjustment loans in the 1990s after the fall of the 283 Berlin Wall and the breakup of the USSR, and so, did not show up in the top 20 of 284 intensive AL countries discussed above. t3.5
Note: IDA status is as of 1980. High adjustment lending means above median (6 adjustment loans).
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287 countries had negative per capita growth and four had positive growth after the initiation 288 of structural adjustment lending. 289 The growth results are very sensitive to when structural adjustment began in each 290 country. We see in Fig. 2 the familiar J-curve pattern of transition country growth overall 291 in the 1990s in these 10 cases. Only Poland and Hungary seem like clear success stories, 292 with Georgia actually the worse case of output decline (explained in part by a civil war), 293 with only a modest recovery after the initiation of adjustment lending. Albania is in 294 between, with strong positive growth after an even stronger output decline. Still, if we 295 follow the convention that we interpret the post-AL growth performance as suggestive of 296 the results of adjustment lending, then at least four of the cases had a positive response. 297 The median response remains negative. 298 The response of inflation to adjustment lending in transition countries was also 299 disappointing. The median percentage inflation rate was 83%. Real interest rates were 300 similarly distorted, either very negative, reflecting financial repression, or positive and 301 very high, indicating noncredible inflation stabilization or excess demand pressure on 302 credit markets. Results on the fiscal balance, current account balance, and black market 303 premium were less disastrous except in a minority of cases. As in the nontransition 304 cases, we again have the result that the worst case scenarios in this group of intensive 305 adjustment lending cases were of very poor outcomes for every variable (see maxes and 306 mins in Table 4) . 307 The transition cases also show a disappointing response to repeated structural 308 adjustment lending. Again, this not prove that adjustment lending was ineffective-it 309 could be that growth would have been even more negative and inflation even higher in the 310 absence of continual structural adjustment lending. But it places a bound on our intuition 311 about the counterfactual-it is necessary to believe that Ukraine would have had a worse 312 outcome that À8.4% per capita growth and 215% annual inflation without 10 adjustment t4.1 Table 4 Successes and failures of repeated adjustment lending among transition countries (all data refer to averages for period from first adjustment loan to 1999 from top 10 in adjustment loans) 
313 loans. The repetition of adjustment loans also suggests that lending continued although the 314 track record on the initial adjustment loans was poor.
315 The other claim made about adjustment lending is that it led to a favorable policy 316 CHANGE over a number of years, even if the average level of policies in adjustment 
317 lending cases was poor. To assess this claim, the next section looks at the descriptive 318 and econometric relationship between successive adjustment loans and policy 319 improvements.
320

Adjustment lending and overall macroeconomic distortions
321
In this section, I first show the descriptive evolution of bad policies and successive 322 adjustment loans. Then, more formally, I pooled time series regressions of indicators of 323 extreme policy imbalances on the cumulative number of adjustment loans using annual 324 data for 1980-99. As highlighted in the Introduction, a positive association between 325 repeated adjustment loans and policy improvements would suggest the bnecessity of 326 multistage treatmentQ story for adjustment lending, while a zero or negative association 327 would suggest that the treatments were ineffective or were inappropriately repeated.
328 To describe the evolution of bad policies, I first construct an overall measure of 329 macroeconomic distortions for each country and year. I define the measure as a dummy 330 variable that takes on the value 1 if any of the principal macroeconomic distortions are in 331 an extreme range. So DISTORTION=1 if any of the following hold: (1) inflation is greater 332 than 40%, (2) the black market premium is greater than 40%, (3) the real exchange rate is 333 more than 40% overvalued, 12 and (4) the real interest rate is less than À5%. These 334 thresholds are arbitrary but the results are not terribly sensitive to the exact threshold for 335 each variable. I choose these variables because they indirectly reflect the degree of 336 macroeconomic imbalances and because we can say unambiguously that extreme levels of 337 these variables are distortionary. Thus, a situation of excess aggregate expenditure relative 338 to income will result in an overvalued exchange rate. An overvalued real exchange rate 339 could also result from a (possibly exchange rate based) stabilization from high inflation 340 that is not credible. If the imbalance is fiscal and financed by money creation, the 341 imbalance will result in high inflation, along with a high black market premium (if the 342 nominal exchange rate is controlled) and a negative real interest rate (if the nominal 343 interest rate is controlled). The 40% threshold for high inflation is chosen because it is the 344 threshold that Bruno and Easterly (1998) showed to be associated with negative growth 345 outcomes. I impose the same threshold for the black market premium and real 346 overvaluation mainly to just have some exogenous threshold. The range for the real 347 interest rate is chosen from the literature on financial repression (below À5%). I restrict the 348 sample to those countries and years that have data on all four macroeconomic distortions. 349 Fig. 3 shows the percent of countries that had severe macroeconomic distortions 350 according to one or more of these four criteria over the structural adjustment period 1980-351 99. The first indication is that macroeconomic distortions did respond to structural 352 adjustment lending, as the percent of countries with distortions declined significantly by 353 1999. Fig. 4 shows instead the percent of observations in which DISTORTION=1 at each 355 successive level of cumulative adjustment lending in the pooled annual sample.
356 Cumulative adjustment lending is defined as the number of IMF and World Bank 357 adjustment loans a country has received since 1980 (none of the transition countries are 358 included in this sample since their lending started more recently and since they lack data 359 on real overvaluation). We see that the proportion of adjustment lending countries with 360 macroeconomic distortions hovered around 50% regardless of the level of cumulative 361 adjustment lending. A high level of repeated adjustment lending was not enough to get 362 severe macrodistortions under control.
13
363
How do we resolve the apparent contradiction between Figs. 3 and 4? There WAS 364 macroeconomic adjustment in all developing countries from 1980-99, but it is not related 365 to the number of adjustment loans each country received. Countries with ten adjustment 366 loans adjusted no more and no less than countries that received little or no adjustment 367 lending. 368 I do not use the fiscal deficit or the current account deficit in this first indicator because 369 it is difficult to say what level is btoo highQ without knowing more about each country's 370 circumstances. On the other hand, correction of fiscal and current account deficits are 371 central to adjustment programs, so I add a rough indicator using (in addition to the four 372 indicators above) a 5% of GDP benchmark for either excessive budget deficits (including 373 grants) or excessive current account deficits. I restrict the sample again to countries that 374 have data on all six indicators, which significantly reduces the sample. I also consider an 375 alternative measure of adjustment lending-the cumulative time spent under an IMF 376 program of any type. This is taken from precise dates from IMF data for each country as to 13 I stopped at 18 adjustment loans because higher levels of adjustment lending do not have a large enough sample to make the statistic meaningful. The sample size is above 20 up to 13 adjustment loans, then above 10 up to 18 adjustment loans, then falls below 10. 
ARTICLE IN PRESS
377 when an IMF program was in effect, which is then measured as a fraction of each year and 378 cumulated since 1980. Similar data is not available from the World Bank.
379 Next, I turn to econometric estimation using these alternative indicators of macro-380 economic distortions and adjustment lending. To concentrate on the performance under 381 repeated adjustment loans, I restrict the sample to countries with at least one adjustment 382 loan (including transition countries) and, as before, I construct the cumulative number of 383 adjustment loans series as the number of adjustment loans the country has received from 384 1980 to the date in question. For the time under IMF agreement variable, I also limit the 385 sample to nonzero observations. I also consider an exogenous time trend in each equation 386 to assess the degree to which policy improved regardless of the intensity of adjustment 387 lending. Finally, I consider whether the relationship between policy improvement and 388 adjustment lending to be nonlinear. 389 Table 5 shows the results of probit regressions of the macroeconomic distortion 390 dummy on cumulative adjustment loans in a pooled cross-section, time series sample. 391 Quadratic terms for adjustment loans or time under IMF programs proved to be 392 insignificant and are not shown. Using either definition of macroeconomic distortion and 393 either indicator of adjustment lending, the regression generally finds a small but 394 statistically significant reduction in the probability of macroeconomic distortions with 395 each additional adjustment loan or each additional year under an IMF program. 396 However, once a time trend is introduced, this effect vanishes. There is a time trend 397 towards reduced probability of macroeconomic distortions that is unrelated to adjustment 398 lending. An additional adjustment loan or an additional year under an IMF program does 399 not reduce the probability of macroeconomic distortions once we control for this time 400 trend. Hence, the message from the econometric estimation is the same as that from 401 Figs. 3 and 4-countries have adjusted over time, but this is unrelated to the number of 402 adjustment loans from the Bank and Fund, and unrelated to cumulative time spent under 403 IMF programs. Table 5 with time since 1980, so this adjustment does not turn out to make 412 much difference.
413 Table 6 presents the pooled probit results on each of the six components of the overall 414 indicator of macroeconomic distortions. The alternative specifications use either number 415 of cumulative adjustment loans or time under adjustment programs as an indicator of 416 structural adjustment lending, and the results are shown with and without a time trend. The 417 dependent variable is whether each indicator surpasses the bextreme imbalanceQ threshold t5.1 Marginal probabilities evaluated at mean of RHS variables.
t5.20
Dummy variable for four macro distortions=1 if inflation N40%, or black market premium N40%, or real overvaluation N40%, or real interest rate bÀ5,% 0 otherwise.
t5.21
Dummy variable for six macro distortions=1 if budget balance/GDP including grants bÀ5%, or current account balance bÀ5%, or inflation N40%, or black market premium N40%, or real overvaluation N40%, or real interest rate bÀ5%, 0 otherwise.
t5.22
Notes to Table 6 : Marginal probabilities evaluated at mean of RHS variables. Macro imbalance=1 for each indicator, respectively, if budget balance/GDP including grants bÀ5%, current account balance bÀ5%, inflation N40%, black market premium N40%, real overvaluation N40%, real interest rate bÀ5%, 0 otherwise. 434 The cross-section regressions are run on these countries that received at least one 435 adjustment loan, totaling 117 countries in all. None of the transition countries are included 436 in these regressions because they lack data on some of the instruments or dependent 437 variables, and, in any case, are inappropriate for comparison since they have been eligible 438 for loans for a shorter period.
439 The problem of identification is addressed by using the bfriends-of-donorQ variables 440 that have been used in the foreign aid literature as capturing political influences that 441 affect whether a country receives bilateral foreign assistance (Boone, 1995; Alesina and 442 Dollar, 2000; Burnside and Dollar, 2000) . The question of multilateral assistance is 443 somewhat different because we do not have X giving to Y because X and Y are allies, 444 rather we have all X's lending to each Y through a multilateral institution. However, 445 the strategic interests of powerful rich nations still plausibly affect the number of 446 adjustment loans a country receives (in one of the more notorious cases, Mobutu's 447 Zaire received nine adjustment loans despite an abysmal policy record). I experiment 448 with a variety of measures including the percent of times that a country voted with the 449 U.S., UK, France, Germany, and Japan at the UN 14 and dummies for countries that were 450 ever a colony of France and the UK. These have all been previously used in the aid 451 literature (see Alesina and Dollar, 2000) . Political versus economic determinants have also 452 been extensively covered in the literature on determinants of IMF lending (see, for 453 example, Bird and Rowlands, 1991, 2002; Rowlands, 1995; Knight and Santaella, 1997; 454 Thacker, 1999) . I introduce a new measure of bfriends of the donorsQ: U.S. military 455 assistance to each country over 1980-99 as an indicator of strategic importance to the U.S. 456 I include the log of population to measure a country's overall geostrategic importance. I 14 In a parallel work, Barro and Lee (2002) also use UN voting patterns as an instrument for IMF lending. 
474
The macroeconomic outcome regressions use the strategic interest instruments for 475 adjustment to attempt to remove the reverse causal effect that could be going from 476 macrooutcomes to adjustment lending. I add the initial level of the policy indicator, and in 477 some regressions other indicators for initial level of development that plausibly affect 478 policy choices (as well as growth). Unfortunately, this empirical strategy fails to uncover 479 an effect of adjustment lending on any of the policy variables in the study, or on per capita 480 growth. This could be because of weak instruments, but, at this point, this study is unable 481 to establish a causal link between adjustment lending and the macroeconomic outcomes, 482 regardless of controlling for initial conditions. 483 Another coefficient of interest in all the regressions is the coefficient on the initial 484 policy level. This coefficient is well below one for all policy outcomes. If we subtract the 485 initial policy level from both sides of the equation, this suggests that the change in policy 486 is a negative function of the initial level of the policy. In other words, there is strong mean 487 reversion in the policy variables. This could help explain why the effect of adjustment 488 lending is not generally significant although the macroeconomic distortions improved over 489 time (see Fig. 4 again). Countries with bad policies in the early 1980s were reverting 490 towards average policy performance over the 80s and 90s, but this improvement does not 491 seem strongly related to the intensity of adjustment lending. 492 The effect of adjustment lending on growth under IV is positive but tiny in magnitude 493 and not statistically significant, controlling for initial growth. This result holds when I 494 introduce additional control variables for initial conditions, like initial income, schooling, 495 and infrastructure (proxied by the log of telephones per worker). I do not want to add the
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496 usual contemporaneous policy variables that go into growth regressions, as I am interested 497 in the reduced form effect of adjustment lending on growth-which may be transmitted 498 through improved policies. This result says that we fail to detect a positive growth effect of 499 whatever policy changes are induced by adjustment lending. This is consistent with the 500 mixed policy changes associated with adjustment lending in the previous paragraph and in 501 the rest of the paper. I conclude that there is no reason to think that the patterns identified 502 in the previous section reflected reverse causality from macroeconomic outcomes to 503 adjustment lending.
504
Conclusions
505
The big stylized facts of adjustment lending suggest that structural adjustment did not 506 succeed in adjusting macroeconomic policy and growth outcomes very much. Structural 507 adjustment loans were repeated many times to the same country, which itself is suggestive 508 of limited effect of the earlier adjustment loans. There were some successes, but also some 509 big disasters. The principal finding is that, taken together or separately, the prevalence of 510 one or more extreme macroeconomic distortions did not diminish as adjustment lending 511 accumulated. There is no evidence in any of the statistical exercises that per capita growth 512 improved with increased intensity of structural adjustment lending. These findings are 513 robust to controlling for endogeneity of adjustment lending and initial policy distortions in 514 the cross-section sample. 515 There are many possible caveats to the findings. Only in the last section do I attempt to 516 address the causality problem, and the instruments there may well be imperfect. In the 517 earlier sections, I provide econometric and other types of descriptive statistics in an 518 attempt to place bounds on what the counterfactual would have to be to generate a positive 519 impact for adjustment lending. The emphasis on repetition of structural adjustment loans is 520 a new contribution to the literature, but this focus may miss some cases of success that 521 only took a small number of adjustment loans. 522 There are also caveats that go in the other direction. I have limited myself to easily 523 quantifiable macroeconomic indicators. Structural adjustment lending also sought to 524 privatize state enterprises, reform inefficient and loss-prone financial systems, remove the 525 penalty imposed on agriculture, improve the efficiency of tax collection and public 526 spending, reform and downsize the civil service, control corruption, and improve many 527 other areas. If anything, progress on these less-quantifiable reforms has been slower than 528 on the macroeconomic indicators, according to complaints in many World Bank and IMF 529 reports.
530 The findings of this paper are reminiscent of results on foreign aid-that foreign aid 531 was not very selective in rewarding good policies and did not on average increase growth 532 (Boone, 1995; World Bank, 1998; Burnside and Dollar, 2000) . The same seems to be true 533 of adjustment lending. Putting external conditions on governments' behavior through 534 structural adjustment loans has not proven to be very effective in achieving widespread 535 policy improvements or in raising growth potential. If the original objective was 536 badjustment with growthQ, there is not much evidence that structural adjustment lending 537 generated either adjustment or growth. 
